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Genocide, State and Self
Louis RENP, BERES*
I
Even in a century that can best be described as the Age of Atrocity,
few people have suffered so terribly as the victims of genocide. Enduring
all that murders and torments, these victims have been identified by their
fellow humans as dark phantoms of subhumanity, suited only for degra-
dation and slaughter. What is more, those who are not directly involved
in the killing and dying witness the daily operations of automated exter-
mination with indifference. Not surprisingly, the appalling silence of good
people is absolutely vital to those who carry out crimes against humanity.
Why? How has an entire species, miscarried from the start, scandal-
ized its own creation? Are we all the potential murderers of those who
live beside us? For as long as we can recall, the corpse has been in fash-
ion. Today, at the close of the twentieth century, whole nations of corpses
are the rage. And this is true despite the codification of anti-genocide
rules under international law.'
* Professor of Political Science and International Law, Purdue University. B.A., 1967,
Queens College of New York; Ph.D., 1971, Princeton University.
1. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
opened for signature December 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force January 12,
1951) [hereinafter "Genocide Convention"]. The Genocide Convention was submitted to the
Senate by President Harry S. Truman in June, 1949. On February 19, 1986, the Senate
consented to ratification with the reservation that legislation be passed that conforms U.S.
law to the precise terms of the Treaty. This enabling legislation was approved by Congress
in October, 1988, and signed by President Reagan on November 4, 1988. This legislation
amends the U.S. Criminal Code to make genocide a Federal offense. It also sets a maximum
penalty of life imprisonment when death results from a criminal act defined by the law.
This follows the practice of implementing legislation already well-established with respect
to crimes of "terrorism." See also Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-473, § 139, ch. XX, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984). This act implements the International Conven-
tion Against the Taking of Hostages and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation. See also Act to Implement the Convention on
Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, and for other purposes,
Pub. L. No. 91-449, 84 Stat. 921 (1970); Anti-Hijacking Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-366, 88
Stat. 409 (1974); Act for the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, Pub. L. 94-467, 90 Stat. 1997 (1976); Convention on the Physical Protec-
tion of Nuclear Material Implementation Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-351, 96 Stat. 1663 (1982);
Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States, Pub. L.
92-539, 86 Stat. 1070 (1972); National Emergencies Act, Pub. L. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976)
(as amended); Federal Income Tax Forgiveness for U.S. Military and Civilian Employees
Killed Overseas, Pub. L. 98-259, 98 Stat. 142 (1984); Pub. L. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037 (1985);
Continuing Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. 99-591, §§ 301-02, 100 Stat. 3341
(1986). For full texts of these legislative acts, see CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE FOR THE
COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 100TH CONG., 1ST SESS., INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: A COM-
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Why? The answer has several levels, several layers of meaning. At
one level, the one most familiar to political scientists and legal scholars,
the problem lies in the changing embrace of Realpolitik in world affairs.
Representing a transformation of the traditional political "realism" of
Thucydides, Thrasymachus and Machiavelli, this deification of the state
has reduced individuals to unfathomable specks of insignificance. In such
a world, one wherein the state is the ultimate value, myriad executions
are heralded as expressions of the sacred.
To prevent genocide, states must first be shorn of their sacredness.
Yet before this can happen, individuals must first discover alternative
sources of belonging and reassurance. In the final analysis, as this paper
will attempt to demonstrate, the underlying problem of genocide, the
level of meaning most important to genuine understanding, is not the dei-
fication of the state per se, but rather the continuing incapacity of per-
sons to draw meaning within themselves. The problem is the universal
and sinister power of the herd in human affairs; a power now applied by
the state, but at any time applicable by other herds.
At its heart, the problem of genocide is one of individuals. Ever fear-
ful of drawing meaning from their own inwardness, human beings draw
closer and closer to the herd. Sometimes it is the Class. Sometimes the
Tribe. Sometimes the Church. Sometimes the Race. Sometimes the State.
Whatever the claims of the moment, the herd spawns hatreds and ex-
cesses that make genocide possible. Fostering an incessant refrain of "us"
versus "them," it prevents each person from becoming fully human and
encourages each person to celebrate the death of "outsiders."
Today the dominant herd, the one that threatens repeated genocides,
is the state. The individual in world politics who supports the omnivorous
appetites of the state does so out of fear. He does not want to be alone;
on the outside. To this end he may find the existence of domestic "para-
sites" and "foreign enemies" absolutely necessary. Small matter that the
victim population, wherever it may exist, is constructed of flesh and blood
itself. Since the individual has chosen to renounce personhood at the out-
set, he is impervious to reason, responding only to the strong emotional
advantages of "belonging."
Each of us contains the possibility of becoming fully human. A possi-
bility that would reduce false loyalties to the state and prevent genocide.
However, only by nurturing this possibility can we achieve personhood.
The task is to discover the way back to ourselves. Otherwise, we fly only
with the ideals of the herd, with a life of conformance and fear that
makes defilement normal. Understood in terms of the contemporary pre-
vention of genocide, this means an obligation to renounce the idolatry of
belligerent nationalism in favor of private accomplishment.
Where shall we begin? First, we will consider the attempt by modern
PILATION OF MAJOR LAWS, TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, AND EXECUTIVE DOCUMENTS, 125-50
(G.P.O. 1987).
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international law to control the corrosive effects of Realpolitik. Thereaf-
ter, we will examine the political requirements of a more dignified and
tolerable world order. Finally, we will explore the essential initiatives of
individual persons. Initiatives that can be ignored only at the expense of
endless and singular infamy.
II
Today there exists a well-established regime for the protection of all
human rights.2 This regime is comprised of peremptory norms, rules that
endow all human beings with a basic measure of dignity and that permit
no derogation by states. These internationally protected human rights
can be grouped into three broad categories:
- first, the right to be free from governmental violations of the integ-
rity of the person - violations such as torture; cruel, inhuman or de-
grading treatment or punishment; arbitrary arrest or imprisonment;
denial of fair public trial; and invasion of the home;
- second, the right to the fulfillment of vital needs such as food, shel-
ter, health care and education; and
- third, the right to enjoy civil and political liberties, including free-
dom of speech, press, religion and assembly; the right to participate in
government; the right to travel freely within and outside one's own
country; the right to be free from discrimination based on race or sex.'
Taken together with other important covenants, treaties and declara-
tions, which together comprise the human rights regime, the Genocide
Convention represents the end of the idea of absolute sovereignty con-
cerning non-intervention when human rights are in grievous jeopardy."
The Charter of the United Nations, a multilateral, law-making treaty,
stipulates in its Preamble and several articles that human rights are pro-
tected by international law. In the Preamble, the peoples of the United
Nations reaffirm their faith "in fundamental human rights, in the dignity
and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women
and of nations large and small" and their determination "to promote so-
2. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, § III, 3 U.N. GAOR
(Resolutions, Pt. 1) at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); International Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature March 7, 1966, 660
U.N.T.S. 195, 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966); International Covenant on Economic, and Social and
Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 6 I.L.M. 368 (1977).
3. See DEPARTMENT OF STATE FOR THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 97TH CONG.,
1ST SESS., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES (G.P.O. 1981).
4. Genocide Convention, supra note 1, art. I. The Genocide Convention proscribes con-
duct that is juristically distinct from other forms of prohibited wartime killing (i.e., killing
involving acts constituting crimes of war and crimes against humanity). Although crimes
against humanity are linked to wartime actions, the crime of genocide can be committed in
peacetime or during a war. According to Article I of the Genocide Convention: "The con-
tracting parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of
war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish."
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cial progress and better standards of life in larger freedom."
In light of these codified expressions of the international law of
human rights, it is abundantly clear that individual states can no longer
claim sovereign immunity from responsibility for gross mistreatment of
their own citizens.' Notwithstanding Article 2 (7) of the U.N. Charter,
which reaffirms certain areas of "domestic jurisdiction," each state is now
clearly obligated to uphold basic human rights. Even the failure to ratify
specific treaties or conventions does not confer immunity from responsi-
bility, since all states are bound by the law of the Charter and by the
customs and general principles of law from which such agreements
derive.'
The international regime on human rights also establishes, beyond
any reasonable doubt, the continuing validity of natural law7 as the over-
riding basis of international law. This establishment flows directly from
the judgments at Nuremberg.' While the indictments of the Nuremberg
5. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the International Terrorism, 28 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 28) at 1, U.N. Doc. A/9028 (1973). International law also authorizes individuals
within certain states to resort to force as insurgents as a permissible means to secure human
rights. Although specially-constituted UN committees and the U.N. General Assembly have
repeatedly condemned acts of international terrorism, they exempt those activities that de-
rive from "the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of all peoples under
colonial and racist regimes and other forms of alien domination and uphold the legitimacy
of their struggle, in particular the struggle of national liberation movements, in accordance
with the purposes and principles of the Charter and the relevant resolutions of the organs of
the United Nations." See also Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), 20 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975), 13 I.L.M. 710 (1974); Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among
States, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (no. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970). See also Cristescu, The Right to Self-Determination: Historical and Current Devel-
opment on the Basis of United Nations Instruments, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub. 2/404/Rev. 1
(1981) (this is a comprehensive and authoritative inventory of sources of international law
concerning the right to use force on behalf of self-determination).
6. The rationale for this claim is grounded in the understanding (codified at Article 38
of the Statutes of the International Court of Justice) that there are multiple sources of
international law and in the associated principle (codified at the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, Article 53) that peremptory or jus cogens norms are overriding and permit
no derogation. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, T.S. No. 993 (entered into force for the United States, Oct. 24, 1945); see also Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, First and
Second Sessions, Mar. 26 - May 24, 1968 and April 9 - May 22, 1969, opened for signature
May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF./39/27, at 289 (1969), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
7. The idea of natural law is based upon the acceptance of certain principles of right
and justice that prevail because of their own intrinsic merit. Eternal and immutable, they
are external to all acts of human will and interpenetrate all human reason. This idea and its
attendant tradition of human civility runs almost continuously from Mosaic Law and the
ancient Greeks and Romans to the present day.
8. See INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIALS, LONDON 1945 (report of Robert
H. Jackson, United States Representative to the Conference, 1949). The judgment of the
International Military Tribunal of October 1, 1946 rested upon the four Allied Powers'
London Agreement of August 8, 1945, to which was annexed a Charter establishing the Tri-
bunal. Nineteen other states subsequently acceded to the Agreement. See also 15 UNITED
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Tribunal were cast in terms of existing positive law (i.e., law enacted by
states), the actual decisions of the Tribunal unambiguously reject the
proposition that the validity of international law depends upon its "posi-
tiveness" (i.e., its explicit and detailed codification). The words used by
the Tribunal ("So far from it being unjust to punish him, it would be
unjust if his wrongs were allowed to go unpunished") derive from the
principle: nullum crimen sine poena (no crime without a punishment).
This principle, of course, is a flat contradiction of the central idea that
underlies "positive jurisprudence" or law as command of a sovereign.9
From the point of view of the United States, the Nuremberg obliga-
tions are, in a sense, doubly binding. This is the case because these obli-
gations represent not only current normative obligations of international
law, but also the higher law obligations engendered by the American po-
litical tradition.10 By its codification of the principle that fundamental
NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 155-88, for
an analysis of defense pleas of "superior orders" in various war crimes trials. For German
war crimes trials after the First World War, including the case of Dithmar and Boldt
(Llandovery Castle Case), see 16 AM. J. INT'L L. 674, 708 (1922).
9. The central idea of legal positivism is that true law is not a set of norms existing
naturally and awaiting discovery, but rather those norms by which states have explicitly
consented to be bound. In international law, those norms are codified in treaties or fall
within the bounds of sources identified in the Statute of the International Court of Justice,
supra note 6, at art. 38.
10. Since justice, according to the Founding Fathers, must bind all human society, the
rights articulated by the Declaration of Independence cannot be reserved only to Americans.
To deny these rights to others would be illogical and self-contradictory, since it would un-
dermine the permanent and universal law of nature from which the Declaration derives.
This understanding was represented by Thomas Paine, who affirmed:
The Independence of America, considered merely as a separation from Eng-
land, would have been a matter of but little importance, had it not been ac-
companied by a Revolution in the principles and practices of Governments.
She made a stand, not for herself only, but for the world, and looked beyond
the advantages herself could receive.
T. PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN, 151 (Everyman ed. 1915).
Where it is understood as resistance to despotism, insurgency has also been defended as
permissible in the Bible and in the writings of ancient and medieval classics. Such defense,
for example, can be found in Aristotle's Politics, Plutarch's Lives and Cicero's De Officiis.
Indeed, in view of the long-standing support for various forms of insurgency in multiple
sources of positive and natural law, it is reasonable to argue that a peremptory norm of
general international law (a jus cogens norm) has emerged on this matter. According to
Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, "[A] peremptory norm of gen-
eral international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of
states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modi-
fied only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character."
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27
(1969), 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969). Even a treaty that might seek to criminalize forms of
insurgency protected by this peremptory norm would be invalid. According to Article 53 of
the Vienna Convention, "A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a
peremptory norm of general international law." Id. The concept is extended to newly emerg-
ing peremptory norms by Article 64 of the Convention: "If a new peremptory norm of gen-
eral international law emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm be-
comes void and terminates." Id. at art. 64.
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human rights are not an internal question for each state, but an imperi-
ous postulate of the international community, the Nuremberg obligations
represent a point of perfect convergence between the law of nations and
the jurisprudential/ethical foundations of the American republic.
In a very real sense, worldwide unconcern for legal protection of
human rights (including, ultimately, genocide) grew out of the post-West-
phalian system of world politics - a system that sanctified untrammeled
competition between sovereign states and that identified national loyalty
as the overriding human obligation. With these developments, unfettered
nationalism and state-centrism became the dominant characteristics of
international relations and the resultant world order came to subordinate
all moral and ethical sensibilities to the idea of unlimited sovereignty.
Such subordination was more than a little ironic, since even Jean Bodin,
who advanced the idea of sovereignty as one free of any external control
or internal division, recognized the limits imposed by divine law and nat-
ural law.
III
There now exists a regime of binding international agreements that
places worldwide human welfare above the particularistic interests of in-
dividual states or elites, but what can this regime be expected to accom-
plish? Granted, there are now explicit and codified rules of international
law that pertain to genocide, but what can be done about their effective
enforcement? Indeed, doesn't a consideration of post-World War II his-
tory reveal many instances of genocide and genocide-like crimes?' Where
11. There has been no interruption of genocide. Greedy for executions, several states
continue to slay segments of their own populations without fear of foreign interference. This
can happen because those states that are not directly involved are driven, above all else, by
the imperatives of geopolitics. Eager to preserve alignments that allegedly improve national
influence, these "innocent" states inevitably subordinate considerations of individual dignity
to the presumed requirements of power.
Left unchecked, the legacy of this corrosive calculus can only be an endless reservoir of
sub-humanity, extraneous to every purpose save loathing and ritual slaughter. In Cambodia,
over one million people were murdered by Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge during the period
1975-79. In Paraguay, the Ache Indians, a peaceful and primitive tribe that has lived for
centuries in the jungles of South America, have been meticulously exterminated by the
Stroessner government and its Nazi war criminal advisors. In Tibet, the forces of the Peo-
ples Republic of China have engaged in killing that threatens the extinction of the Tibetans
as a national and religious group. In South Africa, the sustained barbarism of the white
minority apartheid regime against the majority black population constitutes an arguable
case of genocide.
Although the Pretoria regime does not seek annihilation of the black majority, several
of its particular crimes against this population are proscribed by Article II of the U.N. Con-
vention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. By its forcible trans-
fer of more than three million blacks to desolate "homelands", the apartheid system hopes
to institutionalize nothing less than cost-effective slavery. Furthermore, by its failure to op-
pose "separate development" with more than "constructive engagement," the Reagan ad-
ministration countenanced not merely violations of civil rights, but crimes against
humanity.
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was international law?
To answer these questions, one must first recall that international
law is a distinctive and unique system of law. This is the case because it
is decentralized rather than centralized; because it exists within a social
setting (i.e., the world political system) that lacks government. It follows
that in the absence of central authoritative institutions for the making,
interpretation and enforcement of law, these juridical processes evolve
upon individual states. It is, then, the responsibility of individual states,
acting alone or in collaboration with other states, to make international
law "work" with respect to genocide and genocide-like crimes.
How can this be done? In terms of the law of the Charter, it is essen-
tial that states continue to reject the Article 2 (7)12 claim to "domestic
jurisdiction" whenever gross outrages against human rights are involved.
Of course, the tension between the doctrines of "domestic jurisdiction"
and "international concern" is typically determined by judgments of na-
tional self-interest, but it would surely be in the long-term interest of all
states to oppose forcefully all crimes against humanity. As Vattel ob-
served correctly in the Preface to his The Law of Nations in 1758:
But we know too well from sad experience how little regard those who
are at the head of affairs pay to rights when they conflict with some
plan by which they hope to profit. They adopt a line of policy which is
often false, because often unjust; and the majority of them think that
they have done enough in having mastered that. Nevertheless it can
be said of states, what has long been recognized as true of individuals,
that the wisest and the safest policy is one that is founded upon
justice.13
With this observation, Vattel echoes Cicero's contention that "No
one who has not strictest regard for justice can administer public affairs
to advantage." But how are we to move from assessmqnt to action, from
prescription to policy? Where, exactly, is the normative juncture between
the theory of human rights as pragmatic practice and the operationaliza-
tion of that theory?
Under the terms of Article 56 of the Charter, member states are
urged to "take joint and separate action in cooperation with the organiza-
tion" to promote human rights. Reinforced by an abundant body of ancil-
lary prescriptions, this obligation stipulates that the legal community of
humankind must allow, indeed require, "humanitarian intervention" by
12. According to Article 2(7) of the Charter,
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations
to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement
under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the applica-
tion of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
13. E. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 12a (C.G. Fenwick trans., 1st ed. 1916) (em-
phasis added).
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individual states in certain circumstances. Of course, such intervention
must not be used as a pretext for aggression and it must conform to set-
tled legal norms governing the use of force, especially the principles of
discrimination, military necessity and proportionality.4 Understood in
terms of the long-standing distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in
bello, this means that even where the "justness" of humanitarian inter-
vention is clearly established, the means used in that intervention must
not be unlimited. The lawfulness of a cause does not in itself legitimize
the use of certain forms of violence.
As for the legality of humanitarian intervention, it has been well-es-
tablished for a long time. Although it has been strongly reinforced by the
post-Nuremberg human rights regime, we may find support for the doc-
trine in Grotius' seventeenth-century classic, The Law of War and
Peace.15 Here, the idea is advanced and defended that states may inter-
fere within the territorial sphere of validity of other states to protect in-
nocent persons from their own rulers, an idea nurtured and sustained by
the natural law origins of international law.
While the theory of international law still oscillates between an indi-
vidualist conception of the state and a universalist conception of human-
ity, the post World War II regime of treaties, conventions and declara-
tions concerning human rights is necessarily founded upon a broad
doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Indeed, it is the very purpose of
this regime to legitimize an "allocation of competencies" that favors the
natural rights of humankind over any particularistic interests of state.
Since violations of essential human rights are now undeniably within the
ambit of global responsibility, the subjectivism of state primacy has been
unambiguously subordinated to the enduring primacy of international
justice. In place of the Hegelian concept of the state as an autonomous,
irreducible center of authority (because it is an ideal that is the perfect
manifestation of Mind), there is now in force a greatly expanded version
of the idea of "international concern."'"
14. The idea of proportionality is contained in the Mosaic Lex Talionis, since it
prescribes that an injury should be requited reciprocally, but certainly not with a greater
injury. As Aristotle understood the Lex Talionis, it was a law of justice, not of hatred - one
eye, not two, for an eye; one tooth, no more, for a tooth.
15. The idea expressed at Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, supra note 6, that scholarly writings (of which Grotius' classic is an instance) are a
proper source of international law may have its roots in the following Jewish tradition -
that a fellowship of scholars is entrusted with legal interpretations. This idea diverges from
the Jewish tradition in that Jewish scholars, rather than being actual sources of legal norms,
were always bound by the Talmudic imperative, "Whatever a competent scholar will yet
derive from the Law, that was already given to Moses on Mount Sinai." (JERUSALEM MEGIL-
LAH IV) Yet, even this divergence may not be as far-reaching as first supposed, since one
view of the norm-making character of scholarly writings on international law is that these
writings are never more than exegeses of overriding natural law and that their contributions
to the development of international law are always contingent upon being in harmony with
reason or "true law."
16. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 7. In contrast to the principle of "domestic jurisdiction"
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Within the current system of international law, therefore, external
decision-makers are authorized to intercede in certain matters that might
at one time have been regarded as internal to a particular state. While, at
certain times in the past, even gross violations of human rights were de-
fended by appeal to "domestic jurisdiction," today's demands for exclu-
sive competence must be grounded in far more than an interest in avoid-
ing "intervention." This trend in authoritative decision-making toward an
expansion of the doctrine of "international concern" has been clarified by
Lauterpacht's definition of intervention:
Intervention is a technical term of, on the whole, unequivocal conno-
tation. It signifies dictatorial interference in the sense of action
amounting to a denial of the independence of the State. It implies a
peremptory demand - for positive conduct or abstention - a de-
mand which, if not complied with, involves a threat of or recourse to
compulsion, though not necessarily physical compulsion, in some
form. 1
We can see, therefore, that intervention is not always impermissible,
and that - indeed - any assessment of its lawfulness must always be
contingent upon intent. Applying Lauterpacht's standard, it follows that
where there is no interest in exerting "dictatorial interference," but sim-
ply an overriding commitment to the protection of human rights, the act
of intervening may represent the proper enforcement of pertinent legal
norms. This concept of intervention greatly transforms the exaggerated
emphasis on "domestic jurisdiction" that has been associated improperly
with individual national interpretations of Article 2 (7) of the Charter
and, earlier, with Article 15 (8) of the Covenant of the League of Na-
tions."' By offering a major distinction between the idea of self-serving
(codified in the preceding articles), which recognizes a reserved domain within which a state
can act at its own discretion, "international concern" recognizes limits on this domain com-
pelled by matters of absolutely overriding importance. These matters pertain to a variety of
peremptory norms of international law, especially those involving restraint in the use of
armed force and respect for guaranteed minimum standards of human rights. For example,
notwithstanding the traditionally expressed prerogatives of sovereignty, a state no longer
has the right to claim itself the sole judge in matters involving repression and/or torture of
individuals within its jurisdiction or the use of armed force against a neighboring state.
These are matters of "international concern."
17. See H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 167 (1950).
18. An example of abusing the domestic jurisdiction principle of the Charter can be
found in certain state reactions to Chinese genocide against Tibet in the 1950s. During this
period, according to a report issued by the International Commission of Jurists (The Ques-
tion of Tibet and the Rule of Law) in 1959, the Chinese killed tens of thousands of
Tibetans; deported thousands of Tibetan children; killed Buddhist monks and lamas on a
very large scale; and subjected religious leaders and public officials to forced labor, arbitrary
arrest and torture. The evidence pointed to "a systematic design to eradicate the separate
national, cultural and religious life of Tibet." These facts notwithstanding, the East Euro-
pean socialist states (with the exception of Yugoslavia) acted as a solid bloc in defense of
China, arguing that Tibet was an integral part of the People's Republic and that considera-
tion of the question of Tibet by the U.N. General Assembly constituted an intervention in
China's domestic affairs. For more on this matter, see L. KUPER, THE PREVENTION OF GENO-
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interference by one state in the internal affairs of another state and the
notion of the general global community's inclusive application of law to
the protection of human dignity, it significantly advances the goal of a
just world order. Although this test is hardly free of ambiguity, it does
clarify that the choice between "international concern" and "domestic ju-
risdiction" is not grounded in unalterable conditions of fact, but rather in
constantly changing circumstances that permit a continuing adjustment
of competencies. It follows that whenever particular events create signifi-
cant violations of human rights, the general global community is entitled
to internationalize jurisdiction and to authorize appropriate forms of de-
cision and action.
Ironically, the United Nations, which is responsible for most of the
post-Nuremberg codification of the international law of human rights, has
sometimes been associated with increased limits on the doctrine of hu-
manitarian intervention. These limits, of course, flow from the greatly re-
duced justification for the use of force in the Charter system of interna-
tional law, especially the broad prohibition contained in Article 2 (4).1"
Yet, while it cannot be denied that humanitarian intervention might be
used as a pretext for naked aggression, it is also incontestable that a too-
literal interpretation of 2 (4) would summarily destroy the entire corpus
of normative protection for human rights - a corpus that is coequal with
"peace" as the central objective of the Charter. Moreover, in view of the
important nexus between peace and human rights, a nexus in which the
former is very much dependent upon widespread respect for human dig-
nity, a too-literal interpretation of 2 (4) might well impair the prospects
for long-term security.
It must be widely understood that the Charter does not prohibit all
uses of force and that certain uses are clearly permissible in pursuit of
basic human rights. Notwithstanding its attempt to bring greater central-
ization to legal processes in world politics, the Charter system has not
impaired the long-standing right of individual states to act on behalf of
the international legal order. In the continuing absence of effective cen-
tral authoritative processes for decision and enforcement, the legal com-
munity of humankind must continue to allow, indeed, must continue to
require, humanitarian intervention by individual states.
As we have seen, humanitarian intervention is one way of giving ef-
fect to the enforcement of anti-genocide norms in international law. An-
other way involves the use of courts, domestic and international. Under
Article V of the Genocide Convention, signatory states are required to
enact "the necessary legislation to give effect to" the Convention. Article
VI of the Convention further provides that trials for its violation be con-
CIDE 158-159 (1985).
19. According to Article 2(4), "All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."
U.N. CHARTER, supra note 12, at art. 2, para. 4.
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ducted "by a competent tribunal of the state in the territory of which the
act was committed, or by any such international penal tribunal as may
have jurisdiction."
Here, of course, there are some special problems. First, the Interna-
tional Court of Justice at the Hague has no penal or criminal jurisdiction.
It does, however, have jurisdiction over disputes concerning the interpre-
tation and application of a number of specialized human rights conven-
tions.2" In exercising its jurisdiction, however, the ICJ must still confront
significant difficulties in bringing recalcitrant states into contentious pro-
ceedings. There is still no way to effectively ensure the attendance of de-
fendant states before the Court. Although many states have acceded to
the Optional Clause of the Statute of the ICJ (Article 36, Paragraph 2),
these accessions are watered down by many attached reservations and by
geopolitical concerns of the moment.
Second, courts of the states where acts in violation of the Genocide
Convention have been committed are hardly likely to conduct proceed-
ings against their own national officials (excluding, or course, the possibil-
ity of courts established following a coup d'etat or revolution). What is
needed, therefore, is an expansion and refinement of the practice of states
after World War II, a practice by states that had been occupied during
the war, of seeking extradition of criminals and of trying them in their
own national courts.2
1
In the future, there need be no war or occupation to justify the use of
domestic courts to punish crimes of genocide. There is nothing novel
about such a suggestion since a principal purpose of the Genocide Con-
vention lies in its explicit applicability to non-wartime actions. Limits
upon actions against enemy nationals are as old as the laws of war or
international law. But the laws of war do not cover a government's ac-
tions against its own nationals. It is, therefore, primarily in the area of
domestic atrocities that the Genocide Convention seeks to expand pre-
existing international penal law.
20. Genocide Convention, supra note 1, at art. 9; Supplementary Convention on the
Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery,
Dec. 6, 1967, art. 10, 18 U.T.S. 3201, T.I.A.S. No. 6418; Convention on the Political Rights
of Women, Mar. 31, 1953, art. 9, 193 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees, Jul. 28, 1951, art. 38, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
21. Apart from the prosecution of war criminals, there have been only two trials under
the Genocide Convention by competent tribunals of the states wherein the crimes were com-
mitted: (1) in Equatorial Guinea, the tyrant Macis had been slaughtering his subjects and
pillaging his country for a number of years. He was ultimately overthrown, found guilty of a
number of crimes, including genocide, and executed. (In a report on the trial, however, the
legal officer of the International Commission of Jurists concluded that Macis had been
wrongfully convicted of genocide); and (2) in Kampuchea, when the Khmer Rouge were
overthrown by the Vietnamese, the successor government instituted criminal proceedings
against the former Prime Minister, Pol Pot, and the deputy prime minister on charges of
genocide. The accused were found guilty of the crime in absentia by a people's revolution-
ary tribunal. Pol Pot, of course, is still free. For more on these cases, see L. KUPER, THE
PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE (1985).
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Going beyond Article VI of the Genocide Convention, which holds to
the theory of "concurrent jurisdiction" (jurisdiction based on the site of
the alleged offense and on the nationality of the offender), any state may
now claim jurisdiction when the crime involved is a species of genocide. 22
There is already ample precedent for such a rule in international law, a
precedent based upon the long-standing treatment of common enemies of
mankind (hostes humazi generis) or international outlaws as within the
scope of universal jurisdiction.23
In terms of the broad issue of using domestic courts to uphold inter-
22. Genocide Convention, supra note 1, at art. 1. In addition to the territorial principle
and the nationality principle, there are three other traditionally recognized bases of jurisdic-
tion under international law: the protective principle, determining jurisdiction by reference
to the national interest injured by the offense; the universality principle, determining juris-
diction by reference to the custody of the person committing the offense; and the passive
personality principle, determining jurisdiction by reference to the nationality of the person
injured by the offense. The Genocide Convention itself, however, does not stipulate univer-
sal jurisdiction. See also Demjanjuk v. Petrovisky, 776 F.2d 571, 582-83 (6th cir. 1985), re-
printed in, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CRIMES 286 (Bassiouni ed. 1986). In this recent
case supporting the principle of universal jurisdiction in matters concerning genocide, a U.S.
Court of Appeals ruled for the extradition to Israel of accused Nazi war criminal John
Demjanjuk even though the crimes charged were committed against persons who were not
citizens of Israel and the state of Israel did not exist at the time the heinous crimes were
committed. In the words of the court: "When proceeding on that jurisdictional premise
neither the nationality of the accused or the victim(s), nor the location of the crime is signif-
icant. The underlying assumption is that the crimes are offenses against the law of the na-
tions or against humanity, and that the prosecuting nation is acting for all nations." See
also Blumenthal, Nazi Whitewash in 1940's Charged, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1985, at A5, col.
1. Recent U.S. alacrity in extraditing Nazi war criminals to other countries for prosecution
belies America's protection of such criminals for geopolitical purposes. Substantial evidence
now indicates that U.S. intelligence officials concealed the Nazi records of hundreds of for-
mer enemy scientists to bring them into this country after World War II. The documents
disclosed reveal that many American authorities knew that the entering criminals were "ar-
dent Nazis" implicated in atrocities. Specifically, between 1945 and 1955, some 800 former
enemy rocket experts and other specialists were brought into the U.S. under an American
intelligence program first called "Overcast," then "Project Paperclip."
23. See INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 21, at 284-285. The principle of
universality is founded upon the presumption of solidarity between states in the fight
against crimes. See also II GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI Ac PACIS, ch. 20 (1913); I VATTEL, LE
DROIT DES GENS, ch. 19 (1916). See also Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 49, 6
U.T.S. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 50, 6
U.T.S. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 129, 6 U.T.S. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364; Geneva Convention Rela-
tive to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 146, 6 U.T.S.
3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365. The case for universal jurisdiction (which is strengthened wherever
extradition is difficult or impossible to obtain) is also built into the four Geneva Conven-
tions of August 12, 1949, which unambiguously impose upon the high contracting parties the
obligation to punish certain grave breaches of their rules, regardless of where the infraction
was committed or the nationality of the authors of the crimes. See generally I BASSIOUNI,
INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION IN U.S. LAW AND PRACTICE, ch. 6 (1982); RESTATEMENT OF THE
LAW: THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, §§ 402-04, 443 (Tentative Draft
No. 5, 1961).
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national law, the example of the United States may be of particular inter-
est.2 Since its founding, the United States has reserved the right to en-
force international law within its own courts. Article I, Section 8, Clause
10 of the American Constitution confers on Congress the power "to define
and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses
against the law of nations." Pursuant to this Constitutional prerogative,
the first Congress, in 1789, passed the Alien Tort Statute.25 This statute
authorizes United States Federal Courts to hear those civil claims by
aliens alleging acts committed "in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States" when the alleged wrongdoers can be found in
the United States. At that time, of course, the particular target of this
legislation was piracy on the high seas.
Over the years, United States federal courts have rarely invoked the
"law of nations," and then only in such cases where the acts in question
had already been proscribed by treaties or conventions. In 1979, a case
seeking damages for foreign acts of torture was filed in the federal courts.
In a complaint filed jointly with his daughter, Dolly, Dr. Joel Filartiga, a
well-known Paraguayan physician and artist and an opponent of Presi-
dent Alfredo Stroessner's repressive regime, alleged that members of that
regime's police force had tortured and murdered his son, Joelito. On June
30, 1980, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that since an
international consensus condemning torture had crystallized, torture vio-
lates the "law of nations" for purposes of the Alien Tort Statute. There-
fore, United States courts have jurisdiction under the statute to hear civil
suits by the victims of foreign torture, if the alleged international outlaws
are found in the United States.2 With this in mind, it would be enor-
mously useful - in reference to the control of genocide and genocide-like
crimes - if the United States were to expand its commitment to identify
24. Another case is that of Israel. Recognizing that genociders are common enemies of
mankind and that no authoritative central institutions exist to apprehend such outlaws or
to judge them as a penal tribunal, Israel sought to uphold the anti-genocide norms of inter-
national law in its trial of Adolf Eichmann, a Nazi functionary of German or Austrian na-
tionality. Indicted under Israel's Nazi Collaborators Punishment Law, Eichmann was con-
victed and executed after the judgment was confirmed by the Supreme Court of Israel on
appeal in 1962. Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (Israel Dist. Ct. Jerusa-
lem 1961), aff'd 36 I.L.R. 277 (Israel Supreme Court 1962).
25. See Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982) (originally enacted as part of
the first Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77).
26. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). There is an ironic dichotomy in
U.S. law here. In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, the Second Circuit held that 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (The
Alien Tort Claims Act) provides a basis for aliens to bring actions in U.S. federal courts for
torts committed in violation of the law of nations. Yet, a district court's holding in another
recent case, Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F.Supp. 1421 (C.D. Cal. 1985), means that U.S. citi-
zens lack the private right to sue for violations of the law of nations. Thus, U.S. federal
courts appear to have jurisdiction to hear the claims of aliens more readily than they do the
claims of U.S. citizens. In Handel v. Artukovic, plaintiffs, U.S. citizens, brought a class ac-
tion seeking compensatory and punitive damages against defendant for his alleged involve-
ment in the deprivations of life and property suffered by Jews in occupied Yugoslavia dur-
ing World War II.
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and punish such transgressions within its own court structure and if other
states were prepared to take parallel judicial measures.2 7
IV
We all know, however, that the presumed requirements of Realpoli-
tik invariably take precedence over those of international law. It follows
that before the progressive codification of anti-genocide norms can be
paralleled by the widespread refinement and expansion of pertinent en-
forcement measures, individual states must come to believe that interna-
tional legal steps to prevent and punish genocide and genocide-like
crimes are always in their own best interests.2 Drawing upon the Tho-
mistic idea of law as a positive force for directing humankind to its
proper goals (an idea that is itself derived from Aristotle's conception of
the natural development of the state from social impulses), we need to
seek ways of aligning the anti-genocide dictates of the law of nations with
effective strategies of implementation - i.e., strategies based on ex-
panded patterns of humanitarian intervention, transnational judicial set-
tlement, and domestic court involvement.
To accomplish this objective, primary attention must be directed to-
27. For more on the role of domestic courts in the interpretation and enforcement of
international law, see Kratochwil, The Role of Domestic Courts as Agencies of the Interna-
tional Legal Order, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 236-63 (1985).
28. And this, in turn, requires that individuals within states use their own domestic
courts for supporting the anti-genocide norms of international law. In this connection, U.S.
citizens can participate in nonviolent protests of current foreign policies and can defend
such permissible acts of civil resistance in U.S. courts on the basis of international law.
International law is already a part of U.S. domestic law. According to Article VI of the U.S.
Constitution: "All treaties made...under the authority of the United States shall be the
supreme law of the land .. " It follows that even those who would deny the binding qual-
ity of general international law on U.S. foreign policy must acknowledge the specific obliga-
tions that have been incorporated into domestic law. These obligations flow not only from
Article VI (the so-called Supremacy Clause) but also from the U.S. Supreme Court's deci-
sion in The Paquete Habana, 189 U.S. 453 (1900), which brought customary international
law into U.S. domestic law. Further, in United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937) and
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942), the U.S. Supreme Court held that other types of
international agreements concluded by the U.S. Government that have not received the for-
mal advice and consent of the Senate are nonetheless protected by the Supremacy Clause.
Two criminal cases that have recently produced a major breakthrough in U.S. courts are
People v. Jarka, No. 002170, slip op. (Cir. Ct. Lake County, Ill. 1985) and Chicago v.
Streeter, No. 85-108644, slip op. (Cir. Ct. Cook County, Ill. 1985). Here the defendants were
acquitted by invoking the traditional common law defense known as "necessity." This de-
fense, which erases criminal liability for conduct that would otherwise be an offense (if the
accused was without blame in creating the situation and reasonably believed such conduct
was necessary to avoid a public or private injury greater than that which might reasonably
result from his/her own conduct) has broad applicability concerning genocide and genocide-
like crimes. Because of the Jarka and Streeter acquittals, attorneys representing individuals
who engage in acts of nonviolent civil resistance against elements of U.S. foreign policy may
invoke these cases as appropriate precedents for defense. For an up-to-date and authorita-
tive study of guidelines for defending civil resistance protesters under principles of interna-
tional law, see F. A. BOYLE, DEFENDING CIVIL RESISTANCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (1987).
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ward harmonizing these strategies with the self-interested behavior of
states. Here, it must be understood that the existence of even a far-reach-
ing human rights regime is not enough. Before this regime can make pro-
ductive claims on the community of states, the members of this commu-
nity will need to calculate that such compliance is in their respective
interests. As David Hume once noted, it is the "common sense of inter-
est" that "mutually expressed and . ..known to both ... produces a
suitable resolution and behavior."29 Ultimately, this sort of calculation
will depend, in turn, on the creation of a new world order system - a
planetary network of obligations stressing cooperative global concerns
over adversary relationships. The centerpiece of this-new world order sys-
tem must be the understanding that all states and all peoples form one
essential body and one true community.
Before the realism of anti-genocide ideals can prevail in global soci-
ety, the major states in that society must learn to escape from the con-
fines of a Darwinian context for choosing policy options - a context
wherein major world powers view virtually all of their options within the
limited parameters of bipolar competition and antagonism. Under the ae-
gis of present perspectives, these states have been willing to abide virtu-
ally any evil amongst their allies in the overriding commitment to geopo-
litical advantage. Vitalized by their misconceived intuitions of
Realpolitik, the leaders of the major world powers have abandoned their
states to the instant, to induced cathartic crises that carry them away
from their ideals and their interests at the same time.
To eliminate these crises will not be easy. Indeed, the only real hope
for effective legal remedies concerning genocide lies in the replacement of
Darwinism with globalist thinking in world affairs. Such remedies cannot
be implemented where states feel themselves imprisoned by a recalcitrant
struggle for existence. The presumption of the bellum omnes contra
omnes in international society must first be renounced.
The task, then, is to make the separate states conscious of their im-
perative planetary identity. To succeed in this task will be very difficult.
But it need not be as fanciful as Realpolitikers would have us believe.
Before we assume that genocide is a permanent fixture of international
relations, we must understand that politics can change. And since law fol-
lows politics, the transformation of lethal forms of competition into new
archetypes for global society can give new and effective meaning to anti-
genocide norms.
The initiative must be taken by the superpowers. Before interna-
tional law can prevent genocide and genocide-like crimes, the United
States and the Soviet Union will have to end their all-consuming and pro-
tracted enmity. As long as the present condition of bipolar antagonism
endures, each superpower will continue to accept the doctrine that might
makes right.
29. See D. HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE (H. Aiken, ed., 1948).
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Driven by their intense rivalry, these states will overlook the anti-
genocide obligations of international law. Eager to preserve alignments
that allegedly improve national influence, the United States and the So-
viet Union - as long as they defer to the primacy of the Cold War - will
subordinate considerations of human life and individual dignity to the
presumed requirements of power. In a manner reminiscent of the Holo-
caust, which was permitted to happen only because Nazi intent fused
with Allied "priorities," today's genocides can take place because good
states have more pressing concerns.3"
Consider America. The problem comes back to individuals. Before
America can liberate itself from the confines of endless competition with
a despised adversary, Americans themselves will have to change. Before
the United States can begin to "care" about genocide in other lands,
Americans will have to re-make a society that remains consecrated to
what Hannah Arendt called "thoughtlessness."
There are other features of contemporary American society that
make genocide possible elsewhere. We Americans suffer not only from a
widespread unwillingness to think. We also display a far-reaching inca-
pacity to feel. 31 We are largely creatures of "unfeeling." The passive, af-
30. An example is the U.S. failure to act decisively against apartheid. Significantly,
apartheid is linked with genocide in the International Convention on the Suppression and
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, and several efforts have been undertaken to make
the practice of apartheid punishable under the terms of the Genocide Convention. More-
over, in the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes
and Crimes Against Humanity, November 11, 1970, 754 U.N.T.S. 73, "inhuman acts result-
ing from the policy of apartheid" are qualified as "crimes against humanity." And in vari-
ous U.N. documents, apartheid is associated with both genocide and crimes against human-
ity. See, e.g., General Assembly Resolutions 2545, XXIV, December 11, 1969; and 2438,
XXIII, December 19, 1968. See also International Convention on the Suppression and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Apartheid, entered into force, July 18, 1976, G.A. Res. 3068, 28
U.N. G.A.O.R., Supp. (No 30), U.N. Doc A/9030 (1974); International Convention of the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, entered into force, Jan. 4, 1969, G.A.
Res. 2160A, 20 U.N. G.A.O.R., Supp. (No. 14) U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966).
31. Indeed, our very definitions of pathological behavior omit the most terrible crimes
of unfeeling, including genocide. Using the extant definitions accepted in psychology and
psychiatry, it is not necessarily pathological behavior to take part in mass murder or geno-
cide. Thus, Eichmann and other major Nazi functionaries in the Holocaust were repeatedly
described as "completely sane." What this suggests, inter alia, is the triumph of the absurd,
a world in which mass killers may be "normal" but where legions of harmless people who
suffer mild neuroses and anxieties are characterized as "emotionally disturbed" or "mentally
ill." For an exploration of this situation, which reveals just how far-reaching the absence of
responsibility to others has become in contemporary life, see Charny, Genocide and Mass
Destruction: Doing Harm to Others as a Missing Dimension in Psychopathology, 49 PSY-
CHIATRY: INTERPERSONAL AND BIOLOGICAL PROCESSES 144, No. 2. (1986). Significantly, the
perfectly "sane" genociders have often been able to transfer responsibility to others, and
even to rationalize the transference in terms of legal and ethical obligations. In response to
questioning at his trial in Jerusalem, Eichmann always maintained that he had not only
obeyed orders (at times identifying blind obedience as the "obedience of corpses," or
Kadavergehorsam), but he had also obeyed the law. Moreover, he insisted that he had lived
his entire life according to the moral precepts of the philosopher Kant. In Kant's philoso-
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fectless anti-hero we encounter in fiction is a mirror-image of a real social
situation, a creature of routine who is not deliberately self-destructive,
just "prudent"; not intentionally cruel, just "dissociated."
Although it is true that we enjoy, as Americans, a high degree of con-
ventional political freedoms, it is also true that we are (in an even larger
sense) captives. Bought off by the promises of participation and produc-
tion, we have exchanged our capacity to act as individuals for the "secur-
ity" of centrally directed automata. Enveloped by the comforting fog of
''representative government," we have become unwilling to question.
The danger was already foreseen by Tocqueville, who understood
that democracy can produce its own forms of tyranny. Tocqueville envi-
sioned a benignly operating polity that "hinders, restrains, enervates,
stifles and stultifies" by imposing "a network of petty complicated rules."
Encouraging the citizen to pursue "petty and banal pleasures," and "to
exist in and for himself," democratic "equality" has set the stage for iso-
lation and passivity.
Much of our freedom is an illusion. Indeed, we contribute to our un-
freedom as individuals because we don't recognize the extent of our cap-
tivity. As Rousseau writes in Emile: "There is no subjugation so perfect
as that which keeps the appearance of freedom, for in that way one cap-
tures volition itself."
This brings us to the core of the problem. Bereft of volition, we are
almost reflexively obedient, ever-ready to defer. Captivated by the delu-
sion of potency and autonomy, we have surrendered to impotence and
passionless automatism. Overwhelmed by a burlesque chorus of national
cheerleaders, we seek shelter in the herd.
The ironies abound. Our capitulation to an all-consuming anti-Sovi-
etism has been made possible by the guarantees of a democratic society.
At the same time, these guarantees need not be the source of our debility
as a people and as a nation. Taken as a starting point for a challenge to
current foreign policies - a point for which they were originally intended
- they could contribute to our personal and collective liberation and
thus to our intolerance of genocide.
But a renewed awareness of political freedom is not enough. We must
first understand that the "rewards" of compliance are unsatisfactory; that
they are erected upon the deception that self-worth flows freely from per-
sonal wealth and unceasing consumption. Such an understanding is al-
ready underway, animated by wave after wave of dissatisfaction with the
trappings of "success."
There is no shortage of documentation of this phenomenon. The soci-
ologists have constructed entire libraries of doctoral theses on the topic.
But a more engaging comment has been offered by the novelist Walker
Percy. In a literary career that spans his publication of the novel The
phy, the source of law was practical reason; for Eichmann it was the will of the Fuhrer.
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Moviegoer in 1961 through the publication of his second work of nonfic-
tion, Lost in the Cosmos: The Last Self-Help Book in 1983, Percy's chief
concern has been with "the dislocation of man in the modern age." Struck
by the sense of ennui and meaninglessness that shadows lives nestled by
affluence, Percy tells one interviewer:
The thing that fascinates me is the fact that men can be well-off,
judging by their own criteria, with all their needs satisfied, goals
achieved, et cetera, yet as time goes on, life is almost unbearable.
Amazing!
But it is not really "amazing." In the late twentieth century world of
America, metaphysic is replaced by myth. Deprived of anything remotely
resembling an authentic creed, Americans seek solace in silence. Yet, in
trading off their freedom to disobey for an expanding array of consumer
goods, they inevitably discover unhappiness. It is not that they recognize
the idea fixe of anti-Sovietism as a lie (because they have never really
been interested in foreign affairs as such) but that their reward for "going
along" is not what it was cut out to be.
The connections between an overriding interest in commercial profit
and the practice of genocide is already a matter of historical record. 2
Consider the following bids returned, in Nazi Germany, for the construc-
tion of gas chambers:
1. A. Tops and Sons, Erfurt, manufacturers of heating equipment:
"We acknowledge receipt of your order for five triple furnaces, includ-
ing two electric elevators for raising the corpses and one emergency
elevator ... "
2. Vidier Works, Berlin: "For putting the bodies into the furnace, we
suggest simply a metal fork moving on cylinders . .. ."
3. C.H. Kori: "We guarantee the effectiveness of the cremation ovens,
as well as their durability, the use of the best material and our fault-
less workmanship."33
Despite the balloons and bravado of "a new patriotism," the specta-
cle of America today is one of nihilism. Not daring to look our crimes in
the face, we have surrendered to an unprecedented form of gluttony, an
insatiable craving for more and more that produces nothing in the way of
satisfaction. Desperate to demonstrate our principles and our power, we
succeed only in buttressing injustice and in abdicating our influence. Be-
32. These connections, in turn, are reinforced by the deliberate bewitchment of lan-
guage. In the lexicon of the Third Reich, such words as "extermination," "liquidation" and
"killing" rarely surfaced. Rather, the goal was "final solution" (Endlosung), and the pre-
scribed methods involved "evacuation" (Aussiedlung); "special treatment" (Sonderbehan-
dlung) and "resettlement" (Umsiedlung). Indeed, all communications regarding "final solu-
tion" were subject to a strict "language rule" (Sprachregelung) which was itself a perversion
of language.
33. Shapiro, "A Search for Conscience," Philadelphia Jewish Exponent, March 29,
1968, noted in CHARNY, How CAN WE COMMIT THE UNTHINKABLE? GENOCIDE: THE HUMAN
CANCER 185 (1982).
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reft of an authentic vital energy, we have turned from the possibilities of
wisdom and genuine understanding to a desolate panorama of supersti-
tion and unconcern.
For most Americans, the invitum of the present lies not in the vacant
intuitions of their leaders (for this has always been manifest for anyone
who cares to notice) but in the disappointing exchange of "things" for
silence. In an era where there can be no meaningful differentiation be-
tween the boardrooms of our major corporations and the backrooms of
organized crime, it is not that we expect honesty, but that we feel cheated
by the bargain we have struck. Sickened when we hear our leaders bran-
dish cosmic principles of "freedom" and "democracy" with evangelical
fervor, it is not because we have ever taken such mendacities of language
seriously, but because there has been no felt compensation for our
dishonor.
The barbarians are not all outside the gates. They are also within.
They are ourselves. We remain ready to coexist with genocide unless we
learn to rebel. 4 This rebellion, however, must not be directed against our
political order directly (the ordinary meaning of rebellion), but against
the underlying oppression of a stultifying society.
The herd takes little offense when members of certain other herds
are turned into a corpse. The remedy for this tragedy can never be found
entirely within the domains of interstate relations or jurisprudence. It can
be found only in diminishing the claims of the herd.
The state, of course, is an instance of the herd, a sacred instance. To
prevent genocide, the murderous demands of the state must yield to the
requirements of personhood. However, these demands can never be sup-
pressed through the dead world of ordinary politics. This can be achieved
only through the creation and recreation of Self.
The task is to migrate from the Kingdom of the State to the King-
dom of the Self. But in this movement one must also want to live in the
second kingdom. This is the most difficult part of the needed migration
because the Kingdom of the State has immense attractions. The risks of
34. A good example of such coexistence is Cambodia. When the Vietnam War began to
spill over into neutral Cambodia, Prince Norodom Sihanouk - who brought his country
independence from France in 1954 - was overthrown by a right-wing military faction
headed by Lon Nol. That was in March of 1970. A little more than five years later, on April
17, 1975, the victorious rebels known as Khmer Rouge entered Phnom Penh, and began a
four-year rule of murder and genocide in which almost two million Cambodians were exe-
cuted or starved to death. The terrible story is already a familiar one, especially to those of
us who recall the vivid scenes from the movie "The Killing Fields" or who remember that it
was heavy American bombing that first helped bring Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge to
power. Enduring all that maddens and torments, Cambodia lived in the thickening shadow
of meaningless death until the Christmas of 1978, when Vietnam invaded with a force of
120,000 men and installed its own client government. Today, Vietnam has withdrawn its
troops from Cambodia, and Sihanouk (who officially boycotted the Cambodian peace talks
in Bogor, Indonesia) has expressed fear of a return to power by the Khmer Rouge. Indeed,
says Sihanouk, "Another holocaust is becoming inevitable."
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living within this kingdom become apparent only when the possibilities of
migration no longer exist.
In the end, the problem of genocide is a problem of individuals.
states can exploit the genocidal aspects of Realpolitik because these as-
pects satisfy the needs of normal human beings. In treating others as foul
or pestilential, these people affirm at the same time that they belong to
an elite. There are no special requirements for membership in this elite,
save membership in a dominant group of the state, but this seems to do
nothing to undermine the benefits of "belonging." It is difficult to overes-
timate the importance of the herd - the emotional advantages of belong-
ing to the state - in explaining genocide.
It follows from all this that before we can extricate ourselves from
the most lethal expressions of Realpolitik, individual human beings will
need to discover alternative (to jingoism) and more authentic sources of
reassurance. But this is easier said than done. The journey from the herd
to personhood begins in myth and ends in doubt. For this journey to suc-
ceed, the individual traveler must learn to substitute a system of uncer-
tainties for what he has always believed - to learn to tolerate and en-
courage doubt as a replacement for the comforting woes of statism.
Induced to live against the grain of our civilization, he must become not
only conscious of his singularity, but satisfied with it. Separated from the
herd, he must become aware of the forces that undermine it, forces that
offer him a last remaining chance for resisting complicity in genocide.
We may turn to Kierkegaard for guidance. Recognizing the "crowd"
as "untruth," he warns of the dangers that lurk in submission to
multitudes:
A crowd in its very concept is the untruth, by reason of the fact that it
renders the individual completely impenitent and irresponsible, or at
least weakens his sense of responsibility by reducing it to a fraction..
. . For "crowd" is an abstraction and has no hands: but each individ-
ual has ordinarily two hands ....
The task, then, is for each individual to become a person. Rejecting
the idolatry of militaristic nationalism, each man and woman must learn
to understand the lethal encroachments of the state. Recognizing in most
of their leadership elites an incapacity to surmount collective misfortune
(war as well as genocide), each person must strive to produce his/her own
private expression of progress. "From becoming an individual no one,"
says Kierkegaard, "is excluded, except he who excludes himself by be-
coming a crowd."
We have seen that to fulfill the expectations of a new global society
- one that would erect effective barriers around the crime of genocide -
initiatives must be taken within states. Current national leaders can
never be expected to undertake the essential changes on their own.
Rather, these changes can come only from informed (actualized) publics
throughout the world.
If all of this sounds grandly unpolitical, it is because politics as usual
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cannot prevent genocide. If it all sounds hopelessly idealistic, it must be
recognized that nothing could be more fanciful than relying upon the
power of modern international law or upon the dynamics of geopolitics.
Before we assume that genocide is a permanent fixture of contemporary
international relations, we must understand that politics can change. And
since law follows politics, the transformation of lethal forms of inter-state
competition into new archetypes for global society can give new and effec-
tive meaning to anti-genocide norms.35
35. Such transformation could also give new and effective meaning to norms intended
to control another major category of crimes in international law - the category concerned
with terrorism. In this connection, these norms are already codified in a number of major
treaties and conventions. See especially Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, adopted by
the U.N. General Assembly, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532, reprinted in
13 I.L.M. 43 (1974) (entered into force for the United States, Feb. 20, 1977); Vienna Con-
vention on Diplomatic Relations, April 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500
U.N.T.S. 95 (entered into force for the United States, Dec. 13, 1972); Convention on Of-
fences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft ("Tokyo Convention"), Sep-
tember 14, 1963, 704 U.N.T.S. 219, 20 U.S.T. 2941 (entered into force for the United States
on December 4, 1969); Convention For the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
("Hague Convention"), December 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641 (entered into force for the
United States on Oct. 14, 1971); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Civil Aviation ("Montreal Convention"), September 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564
(entered into force for the United States on Jan. 26, 1973); Internation Convention Against
the Taking of Hostages of December 17, 1979, G.A. Res. 34/146, 34 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.
46) at 245, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979) (entered into force on June 3, 1983) (entered into force
for the United States on December 7, 1984); European Convention on the Suppression of
Terrorism, January 27, 1977, E.T.S. 90 (entered into force on August 4, 1978). On December
9, 1985, the U.N. General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution condemning all acts
of terrorism as "criminal." Never before had the General Assembly adopted such a compre-
hensive resolution on this question. Yet, the issue of particular acts that actually constitute
terrorism was left largely unaddressed, except for acts such as hijacking, hostage-taking and
attacks on internationally protected persons that were criminalized by previous custom and
conventions. See UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION ON TERRORISM OF DECEMBER 9, 1985, G.A.
Res. 40/61, 40 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No 53) at 301, U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (1985).

